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Abstract
This article provides the first history and critique of Aus-
tralia’s private refugee sponsorship program, the Commu-
nity Support Program (CSP). As more countries turn to 
community sponsorship of refugees as a means to fill the 
“resettlement gap,” Australia’s model provides a cautionary 
tale. The CSP, introduced in 2017, does not expand Aus-
tralia’s overall resettlement commitment but instead takes 
places from within the existing humanitarian resettlement 
program. The Australian program charges sponsors exor-
bitant application fees, while simultaneously prioritizing 
refugees who are “job ready,” with English-language skills 
and ability to integrate quickly, undermining the principle 
of resettling the most vulnerable. As such, we argue that the 
CSP hijacks places from within Australia’s humanitarian 
program and represents a market-driven outsourcing and 
privatization of Australia’s refugee resettlement priorities 
and commitments.
Résumé
Cet article offre la première histoire et critique du pro-
gramme de parrainage privé des réfugiés en Australie, le 
Community Support Program (CSP). Alors que de plus en 
plus de pays se tournent vers le parrainage communautaire 
pour combler les besoins en matière de réinstallation, le 
modèle australien tient lieu de mise en garde. Le CSP, intro-
duit en 2017, n’étend pas les engagements de l’Australie en 
matière de réinstallation, mais accapare des places au sein 
du programme humanitaire de réinstallation déjà existant. 
Le programme australien impose aux parrains des frais 
de demande exorbitants tout en donnant la priorité aux 
réfugiés qui sont prêts à occuper un emploi, qui ont des 
compétences linguistiques en anglais et qui sont capables 
de s’intégrer rapidement, minant ainsi le principe de réins-
tallation des plus vulnérables. Nous soutenons que le CSP 
détourne des places du programme humanitaire australien 
et représente une sous-traitance axée sur le marché ainsi 
qu’une privatisation des priorités et engagements de l’Aus-
tralie en matière de réinstallation. 
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Introduction
At a time when the global gap between refugee resettlement 
needs and resettlement places made available by govern-
ments is widening, countries around the world are increas-
ingly looking to community sponsorship to expand and 
supplement their refugee resettlement. In September 2016 
a meeting of UN General Assembly states resulted in the 
New York Declaration of Refugees and Migrants, wherein 
member states agreed to negotiate a Global Compact on 
Refugees in order to strengthen the international refugee 
regime’s response to large refugee movements. The resulting 
final draft of the Global Compact on Refugees calls upon 
states “to establish private or community sponsorship pro-
grams that are additional to regular resettlement” in order to 
provide timely access to durable solutions for refugees.1 Fol-
lowing from the New York Declaration, a number of states 
are experimenting with community sponsorship programs, 
following in the footsteps of Canada’s long-running pro-
gram, including the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, 
Argentin, and some in the European Union.
In the lead-up to the New York Declaration, Australia 
confirmed its intentions to join this list and implement a 
permanent community sponsorship program. Australian 
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced that “in addi-
tion to our existing programs, Australia will … create new 
pathways for refugees to resettle in Australia through the 
establishment of 1000 places under a Community Support 
Programme, where communities and businesses can spon-
sor applications and support new arrivals.”2
This article provides the first detailed overview of Aus-
tralia’s historical and current approaches to community 
sponsorship. In particular, it addresses the current Commu-
nity Support Program (CSP), which formally began in late 
2017, and the Community Proposal Pilot (CPP), which began 
in 2013 and preceded the CSP. As well, it traces Australia’s 
prior experimentation in this policy area, namely the Com-
munity Refugee Settlement Scheme (CRSS), which ran for 
almost twenty years from 1979 to 1997. In doing so, we argue 
that potentials of private sponsorship cannot be assessed 
independently of the details and national context of specific 
sponsorship programs. The manner in which sponsorship 
programs are framed and promoted by nation states, as well 
as the design, are factors that determine the value of sponsor-
ship programs, particularly when such programs are framed 
as “complementary” pathways to traditional government-led 
resettlement. 
While the CSP provides a much-needed counterpoint 
to Australia’s infamous Operation Sovereign Borders—a 
“military-led” border control program centred upon secu-
ritization and the absolute control of refugee movements3—
there are problematic policies built into the program, which 
include a lack of additionality;4 prohibitively high visa appli-
cation charges and processing fees; discriminatory selection 
criteria; and lack of community engagement in the design 
and participation of the program. Read together, Australia’s 
CSP is best understood as an exercise in the privatization 
of resettlement responsibilities and costs that ultimately 
reduces the Australian government’s overall commitment to 
resettlement. The use of private funding to directly replace 
government-funded places, and the preference for “work-
ready” refugees, which characterize the CSP, entail that the 
Australian program cannot be characterized as creating a 
complementary pathway to resettlement. Instead, we argue 
that in its current form it represents a market-driven out-
sourcing and privatization of the existing refugee program. 
This view is echoed in the government’s own framing of the 
program, which it has promoted not only as “cost saving,” 
but as a revenue-raising measure.
We argue that the Australian experience—in particular, 
the CSP—provides cause for pause and caution. While com-
munity sponsorship has considerable untapped potential 
in Australia, the parameters of community sponsorship 
schemes need to be carefully crafted and managed to ensure 
that governments do not use sponsorship to shift the cost of 
long-standing public programs for resettling refugees onto 
private actors, further entrench controlled migration as a 
precondition to offering protection to refugees, and shift 
resettlement focus away from the most vulnerable refugees—
risks that are inherent within the current CSP framework. 
In the first part of this article, we explain the history, 
design, and focus of the CRSS and the motivation for this 
program, which provides important background to contem-
porary private sponsorship in Australia. The following sec-
tions outline and critique the CpP and the CSP, with a focus 
on the political context of control and deterrence of refugee 
arrivals, into which both programs were introduced. Finally, 
we highlight the risks of “exporting” the Australian model to 
other jurisdictions and examine the sustained community—
and sector-based efforts to promote reform and improve-
ment of the CSP in Australia.
The Community Refugee Settlement Scheme
While there is a vast literature on refugee resettlement in 
Australia,5 there is little mention of Australia’s historical use 
of community sponsorship to support the resettlement of 
refugees and humanitarian entrants. While Australia may 
appear as a newcomer to community sponsorship programs, 
it has, in fact, a significant history with community sponsor-
ship through the Community Refugee Settlement Scheme 
(CRSS) that ran from 1979 to 1997. The CRSS, which helped 
to settle and integrate over 30,000 refugees in Australia, was 
a critical part of Australia’s response to the Indochinese 
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refugee crisis and a key feature of Australia’s resettlement 
policies in the 1980s and early 1990s.6 
The program was introduced on 30 October 1979 by the 
minister for immigration, Michael MacKellar, following a rec-
ommendation of the Australian Refugee Advisory Council.7 
MacKellar had floated the idea of a community sponsorship 
program a year prior, as part of a reconsideration of Aus-
tralia’s strategic response to the Indochinese refugee crisis, 
in particular the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees from 
countries of first asylum.8 A particular challenge facing the 
Australian government at the time was that resettled refugees 
were accommodated and processed in government-run hos-
tels and migrant centres before being dispersed into the wider 
community.9 Not only were these migrant centres and hostels 
costly to run, they also couldn’t cope with large numbers of 
Vietnamese refugee arrivals whom the Australian government 
had agreed to resettle. MacKellar thus identified a “need to 
cope with the transition from hostels to the community.”10 
At its core, the CRSS was a mechanism to allow refugees to 
bypass government-run migrant centres and hostels and be 
moved directly into the Australian community, into the care 
of those members of the local community who had under-
taken to provide assistance. The aims of the CRSS were to: 
• give members of the community an opportunity to 
become directly involved in the settlement of refugees 
and contribute to their integration; 
• provide an alternative means of settlement for refugees 
who have a capacity to integrate quickly into the Aus-
tralian community; 
• encourage greater awareness of the government’s refu-
gee resettlement program; and 
• achieve a more geographically dispersed settlement of 
refugees through the Australian community.11
Initially the CRSS was available only to support Vietnam-
ese refugees, but it was later expanded to cover Eastern Euro-
pean and Latin American refugees.12 The CRSS was open to 
participation by established voluntary agencies (including 
religious organizations), organized groups of individuals, 
employers, and individuals as supporters. It was envisaged 
that the majority of offers of support would come from vol-
untary agencies, but offers from individuals who could dem-
onstrate a capacity to fulfill sponsorship obligations would 
also be considered.13 Individuals were required to have 
“back-up” support from an established group or organization, 
in the event that they could not fulfill their responsibilities.14 
Initially sponsors could also nominate a preference for spon-
soring a specific ethnic group, family size and composition, 
or specific employment or linguistic skills, but they were not 
able to propose a refugee by name for CRSS sponsorship.15 
Applications to participate in the scheme were vetted by 
the Community Refugee Resettlement Committee.16 The 
committee had to be satisfied on both the eligibility of the 
persons or group to participate in the CRSS as sponsors, as 
well as the viability of the support offer. Whether a person 
or group was deemed eligible to participate as a sponsor 
depended on factors that included the standing of the group 
or organization, the level of financial resources, and their 
demonstrated capacity to assist refugees including previous 
experience with refugee settlement and community welfare 
matters. The viability of offers was tested against a range of 
criteria, which were strongly focussed on the quality and 
security of the resettlement assistance being offered. The cri-
teria included the period of support offered, the suitability 
of accommodation, the avoidance of isolation, the prospect 
of securing employment for the refugees in the area, and 
the provision of English-language training. While, in theory, 
the CRSS allowed individuals, businesses, and community 
groups to provide sponsorship, as noted below the majority 
of sponsorships came from family members who used the 
CRSS to facilitate family reunion. The other major source of 
sponsors derived from church-based or ethnic community 
groups.17 There is very little evidence that businesses were 
involved in the CRSS.
The Australian government was responsible for process-
ing and transporting refugees from abroad to Australia, 
and to the locality where they were to receive CRSS sup-
port. Entrants under the CRSS were selected from a pool of 
refugees who had passed the government’s “normal refugee 
selection criteria.”18 Beyond meeting the criteria for a refu-
gee, considerable discretion was left to decision-makers at 
overseas posts to refer resettled refugees for CRSS support. At 
one end of the spectrum, nuclear families and groups who 
could speak English with reasonable employment prospects 
were always “well received.”19 In particular, when Australia 
introduced the Special Humanitarian Program (SHP) in 1981, 
many of these applications for entry also included offers of 
CRSS support. The SHP allowed individuals to nominate fam-
ily members for resettlement to Australia. To be eligible for 
the SHP, applicants were required to “demonstrate a personal 
claim on Australia by virtue of having close relatives settled 
here, close former ties with Australia or, for a small number, 
a strong and well-established community which [was] well-
organised and able and willing to provide all necessary set-
tlement support.”20 By 1983 some 60 per cent of CRSS cases 
were family reunion cases, whereby CRSS offers of support 
upon arrival were attached to refugee and SHP cases (in effect 
a form of co-sponsorship).21 While it is beyond the scope 
of this article to provide a full analysis, the use of CRSS as a 
family reunification program was not well received by the 
Australian government. In essence, the government consid-
ered that the CRSS had morphed from a settlement support 
program into a “queue-jumping” or a “de facto sponsorship” 
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mechanism that circumvented uniform management of the 
humanitarian program.22
At the other end of the spectrum, the CRSS also placed 
special emphasis on “doubly-disadvantaged cases” includ-
ing “the disabled, single parent families, and families who 
have individuals who, for some other reason, have a higher 
than usual chance of encountering settlement difficulties.”23 
In such doubly disadvantaged cases, a CRSS referral might 
“change the balance in favour of approving the application” 
for resettlement to Australia.24 
Another important feature of the CRSS, especially in light 
of Australia’s current program, was the level of government 
support provided to sponsorship groups. Support groups 
were eligible for government support for second and subse-
quent entrants, initially $170 for an individual and $450 for 
a family of four, and $70 for each additional family member 
in 1983.25 Support groups could also benefit from taxation 
concessions in the form of income tax deductions for dona-
tions and exemptions from sales tax for goods purchased 
to support the settlement of entrants. Further, sponsorship 
groups were provided with training by the Department of 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, and a quarterly newsletter 
was published to allow sponsors from each different state 
and territory to share their experiences.
The first group of refugees to be supported under the 
scheme were a group of twenty families, who were settled 
in Whyalla under the auspices of the St. Theresa’s Refugee 
Resettlement Committee.26 In the first eight months of its 
operation, 766 Indochinese refugees were resettled under the 
scheme.27 Between 1980 and 1993, the CRSS helped to settle 
over 30,000 refugees in Australia and, at its peak, accounted 
for approximately 32 per cent of Australia’s overall refugee 
and humanitarian intake (see table 1).
While the CRSS has not been subjected to rigorous aca-
demic study, a number of independent and government ini-
tiated reports pointed to the important role that the scheme 
played in facilitating the successful settlement of refugees in 
Australia.28 The largest study of the CRSS was conducted by 
MSJ Keys Young in 1981,29 commissioned by the Australian 
government and based on interviews with 157 refugee fami-
lies and sponsors around Australia. The report painted the 
CRSS in a very positive light: “It is clear that the CRSS operates 
successfully to assist refugees in settling in Australia. It has 
demonstrated that the genuine care and the great time and 
effort offered by community people ensures that the refugees 
make use of all the services available in their communities.”30
The report also highlighted deficiencies with the operation 
of the scheme, including that matching refugees to sponsors, 
Table 1. Refugees supported through the CRSS, 1980–1993
Year CRSS Total
CRSS as an approximate percentage of 
total refugee and humanitarian intake
1980 766 19,954 4%
1981 1569 22,545 7%
1982 2550 21,917 12%
1983 2242 17,054 13%
1984 2240 15,485 14%
1985 2191 14,207 15%
1986 2154 11,700 18%
1987 2509 11,291 22%
1988 2552 11,392 22%
1989 3480 11,309 31%
1990 3885 12,415 31%
1991 3580 11,284 32%
1992 2733 12,009 23%
1993 3419 11,845 29%
Sources: Data derived from Department of Home Affairs, Historical Migration Statistics (May 2018); Department of Immigra-
tion, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, “Our Good Friends”: Australians Helping Refugees to a New Life (Sydney: Depart-
ment of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, 1991), 62.
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especially in rural areas, resulted in some refugees not being 
able to access appropriate services and employment oppor-
tunities. It also identified that some sponsor groups were not 
adequately prepared for the level of financial support required, 
and that sponsors’ overbearing behaviour caused difficulties.31 
Other reports later in the life of CRSS also raised concerns 
about its implementation. For example, a 1998 report by the 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) highlighted defi-
ciencies in the manner in which the CRSS was implemented 
by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. 
The ANAO report found that the department’s “procedures 
for review and accountability of [sponsorship] groups are 
not working well.”32 In particular, the department had not 
properly followed its own procedures for accepting groups 
as CRSS sponsors, and, as the result of resource constraints, 
had not monitored sponsorships to the required level.33 Such 
concerns were also highlighted by the Refugee Council of 
Australia (RCOA), which noted that the expectations and 
responsibilities of CRSS groups had grown, while logistical 
and training support from the department had been reduced 
in response to funding restrictions.34 
 The CRSS was formally disestablished in 1997 and 
replaced by the Integrated Humanitarian and Settlement 
Strategy (IHSS).35 The IHSS represented a departure from 
previous settlement policies, as it aimed for entrants to attain 
self-sufficiency as soon as possible rather than encouraging 
dependency. Under the IHSS, settlement services were con-
tracted out to private service providers who were respon-
sible for providing intensive initial settlement support to 
all humanitarian entrants.36 Many of the services available 
under the IHSS were precisely the types of support previously 
provided by community sponsors.37 However, community 
groups were allowed to contribute in a volunteer capacity to 
complement IHSS services and were provided with training 
to do so.38 After the cessation of the CRSS, the sponsorship 
of refugees for entry into Australia continued informally 
through the SHP. 
Overall, the available literature suggests that the CRSS 
was a positive component of Australia’s resettlement policy. 
While the CRSS was not a sponsorship scheme for entry into 
Australia, it provided a post-settlement support mechanism 
and one that enabled the Australian government to reset-
tle refugees throughout the country at a relatively low cost. 
Importantly, the CRSS facilitated and complemented Austral-
ia’s resettlement program that was at the time largely focused 
on vulnerable refugees and family reunification.
Australia’s Contemporary Sponsorship Programs
Given the breadth and relative successes of the CRSS, its 
absence in government discussions surrounding proposals for 
a new sponsorship program is surprising. Our research could 
not find any reference to the CRSS in relevant government 
papers or policies. The very different framing of the programs, 
and the political context into which the CPP and CSP were pro-
posed—of deterrence and control rather than reception and 
integration—goes some way to explaining this absence. This 
section outlines the contemporary community sponsorship 
programs, highlighting the broader political framing of both 
the purpose and potential of the CPP and CSP.39 
Prior to the introduction of the CPP, the Commonwealth 
government expressed interest in a community sponsor-
ship program in its 2012 budget and released a discussion 
paper examining the “feasibility of a pilot which would 
enable organisations to propose a person, in a humanitar-
ian situation, for entry to Australia under the Humanitar-
ian Program.”40 More than sixty submissions were received 
in response to the paper, from humanitarian organizations, 
faith-based groups, community organizations, settlement 
service providers, and state and local governments.41 In 
addition to receiving submissions, in August 2012 the 
Department of Immigration conducted two formal meetings 
with representatives from refugee advocacy and settlement 
organizations and community and faith-based organizations. 
They also held informal meetings and discussions.42 The 
government did not make any of the outcomes or recom-
mendations of this approximately six-month consultation 
period publicly available. Notably, the submissions to the 
2012 discussion paper were not published, despite publica-
tion being the usual practice. 
As these consultations were taking place, the govern-
ment commissioned the report of the Houston Expert Panel 
on Asylum Seekers. In this period, the number of refugees 
arriving by boat to Australia had reached record highs,43 and 
the Labor government was cast by media outlets as “losing 
control” of the border.44 The expert panel was charged with 
producing a report on “how best to prevent asylum seekers 
risking their lives by travelling to Australia by boat.”45 Whilst 
commissioned as an independent report, the document was 
broadly seen as means to enable the Labor government to 
re-establish third-country processing, despite fulfilling an 
election promise to end offshore detention and repealing 
the policy in 2008. The 2012 re-establishment of Australian-
funded detention centres in Papua New Guinea and Nauru 
in order to provide a “circuit breaker to the current surge 
in irregular migration to Australia” was the most immedi-
ate and significant outcome of the report.46 However, the 
panel also made a range of recommendations on Australia’s 
humanitarian program more broadly, and directly addressed 
the possibility of private humanitarian sponsorship. 
In the context of addressing the costs associated with the 
panel’s recommended expansion of Australia’s “orderly” off-
shore humanitarian intake,47 the report suggested,
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Private and community sponsorship within Australia’s humanitar-
ian program could provide some important opportunities to assist 
with its expansion in a productive, cost-effective and community-
based way. It is important that the private and community sponsor-
ship arrangements be responsibly utilised to their full potential. The 
panel expects that it may be possible to develop a sponsorship model 
that reduces the costs of a place under the humanitarian program by 
up to one-third and considers that any savings achieved through such 
an initiative should be used to offset other costs under the expanded 
program.48 
In this and its other recommendations, the focus of the 
report was not on just the implementation of measures to 
“expand regular humanitarian pathways,” but also the “crea-
tion of disincentives” to irregular maritime migration that 
are “immediate and real”—and, by implication, punitive in 
their effect.49 These objectives formed the political context 
in which the CPP was designed and introduced. The prospect 
of reducing the cost of the humanitarian program through 
sponsorship and the promotion of regular, “controlled” 
migration pathways were recurring themes in the introduc-
tion of the CPP and the subsequent CSP. 
In the same period, the government further limited access 
to any meaningful form of family reunion for refugees arriv-
ing without authorization. As noted above, SHP has become 
the primary means by which refugee entrants are able to 
access family reunion in Australia. Alongside the barriers 
of high costs and prohibitively long delays,50 refugees who 
arrived in Australia by boat after August 2012 have no access 
to any form of family sponsorship, and later, in 2016, appli-
cations made by those who arrived by boat before this date 
were directed to be given the lowest processing priority.51 
These policies, directed towards “irregular” arrivals, rein-
force concerns discussed below that private sponsorship in 
Australia is an expensive, proxy form of family reunion and 
exploits the undersupply or absence of other family reunion 
pathways.52 Moreover, it is well recognized that other migra-
tion pathways for family reunion such as partner, child, and 
parent visas are out of reach for many refugees due to their 
high visa applications costs, stringent eligibility criteria, or 
simply because some visas are subject to extremely pro-
longed waiting periods. 
When the CPP was formally announced in mid-2013, it 
constituted Australia’s first program for the full private spon-
sorship of humanitarian entrants by individuals, businesses, 
or community organizations.53 Humanitarian entrants, for 
the purposes of the CPP and the subsequent CSP, are defined 
as refugees or persons outside of their home country who are 
subject to gross violations of their human rights. The pilot 
was to provide for up to 500 places per annum within the 
offshore component of Australia’s humanitarian program, 
rather than in addition to existing humanitarian commit-
ments.54 Sponsors could participate in the program only via 
organizations selected and approved by the Department of 
Immigration, known as Approved Proposing Organisations 
(APOs). APOs were responsible for proposing an applicant 
and managing the sponsorship application, as well as ensur-
ing sponsors were able to meet the costs of sponsorship and 
resettlement. Under the pilot, there were five recognized 
APOs, four of which were based in two Australian states 
(New South Wales and Victoria).55 The costs of sponsorship, 
which we discuss further below, included a fee paid to APOs 
for their services. 
The first CPP applications were lodged in October 2013, 
and the first visas granted in February 2014.56 Notably, 
under the CPP, while sponsorees were required to meet the 
definition of a humanitarian entrant, and CPP applicants 
were prioritized over the SHP entrants,57 applicants were not 
selected or prioritized on the basis of evidence of a job offer, 
English-language skills, or age. Over the course of the 2013–
14 financial year, 154 applications were received under the 
CPP, representing 570 individuals. Over the same period, 245 
visas were granted under the CPP.58 Between the lodgement 
of the first applications under the CPP in October 2013 and 
the review of the program on 29 March 2015, 305 applications 
had been received under the pilot, representing more than 
1,100 individuals. Over this period, 667 visas were granted 
under the CPP. Both demand for the program and the limited 
number of places resulted in the program being “consistently 
oversubscribed,” and even though capacity to integrate was 
not a formal priority, in 2016 the government reported that 
over 61 per cent of places were awarded to applicants under 
forty.59 The highest number of applications and grants were 
made in relation to sponsorees from Syria, followed by Iraq. 
Other visa grants were made to individuals from Afghani-
stan, Eritrea, and Somalia.60 
In 2015 the government sought public submissions in a 
review of the CPP. Under the heading “What happens next?” 
the paper noted that “community feedback through this 
discussion paper will inform government considerations 
on the feasibility and possible model of a Community Sup-
port Programme.”61 Once again neither the submissions 
in response to the discussion paper, nor the government’s 
view of the submissions, was made public. Of the submis-
sions that were published by the submitting organizations, 
the consensus in the nature of the concerns raised about the 
CPP and in the accompanying recommendations for reform 
is noteworthy. In data released to the authors under Free-
dom of Information laws, the government’s own summary 
of public submissions noted that thirteen out of seventeen 
respondents recommended that the CPP operate in addition 
to the existing humanitarian program; that “stakeholders” 
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supported retaining the standard humanitarian eligibility 
criteria (rather than add new criteria such as capacity to 
work), and that “most organisations” submitted that visa 
application charges should be lowered.62 
Despite government engagement of participating organi-
zations and stakeholders in a formal consultation, not one 
of the above recommendations was incorporated into the 
final program. RCOA, the peak body for refugee organiza-
tions in Australia, noted in its representative submission to 
the inquiry that as a result of the high cost of the CPP, and 
its lack of additionality, the CPP’s design risked undermining 
the humanitarian commitments of Australia’s program and 
the potential of securing genuine community involvement 
in “community” sponsorship.63 In RCOA’s annual consulta-
tions in 2016, many community members expressed concern 
that the CSP was accessible only to those who could afford to 
pay the high fees.64
In spite of these concerns, when the CSP was announced in 
2017, the legal frameworks that governed the program more 
or less mirrored the design of the CPP, albeit with an entirely 
new set of selection criteria and higher fees. The most sig-
nificant changes to the policy included an increased annual 
quota of sponsored places to 1,000 per annum from the pre-
vious 500, though again without an increase in Australia’s 
overall offshore humanitarian intake, and the announce-
ment that priority would be given to applicants meeting 
specific criteria on age, language skills, capacity to work, and 
the government’s own “resettlement priorities.” At the time 
of writing, implementation of the permanent CSP program 
is still in very early stages. Eleven APOs were announced in 
early 2018,65 and in May 2018 the CSP was tracking not to 
fulfill the quota for the 2017–18 financial year.66
Critiques of the Community Support Program
Despite the claim that it draws from the experience of Cana-
da’s private sponsorship program,67 Australia’s CSP does not 
enhance or expand Australia’s refugee resettlement program. 
Instead, the program is best understood as an exercise in 
the privatization of resettlement responsibilities and costs, 
which preserves a policy of strict government control over 
the terms of refugee entry and resettlement. Instead of taking 
into account community views, the Australian government 
appears to have heeded assessments of the CPP model as a 
“credible means” of providing humanitarian support “without 
placing additional strain on the Commonwealth budget.”68 
As noted, and unlike Canada, the CSP quota of 1,000 places is 
not additional to the government’s Refugee and Humanitar-
ian Program (RHP). This means that each sponsored refugee 
takes a place away from the government’s own resettlement 
commitment. In 2013 the Australian government announced 
that it would increase the RHP quota from 13,750 to 18,750 in 
2018–19, including 2,750 places reserved for in-country asy-
lum applicants.69 However, with the introduction of the CSP, 
it became clear that this increase would be offset by 1,000 
places set aside for private sponsors. As such, the CSP can be 
seen as a way to outsource the government’s commitments, 
exploiting the community’s good will, or, as is more often the 
case, a family’s desperation.70
Indeed, the CSP has been promoted by the Australian 
government as a means to create “a sustainable model of 
private sponsorship for refugees that minimises costs to 
governments.”71 According to governmental estimates, the 
program “will provide a revenue gain to the budget of $26.9 
million” over the first four years.72 This revenue gain comes 
from the high costs of the visa fees, including a AU$2,740 
non-refundable application fee and a second instalment fee 
of AU$16,444 for the main applicant and AU$2,680 for each 
secondary applicant (family member).73 In addition to visa 
fees, sponsors are required to pay fees to the Apo. These fees 
are not fixed or regulated by the Australian government and 
are as high as approximately AU$20,000, per application.74 
Sponsors are also required to cover the costs of airfares 
and medical checks prior to arrival. Most notably the visa 
application charges do not directly cover or fund the cost of 
the applicant’s resettlement. That is, they are simply trans-
action fees paid to the Australian government that are not 
attached to any clear service provided by the government to 
the humanitarian migrant or sponsor.75 Once the sponsored 
refugee has arrived, sponsors are required to cover all living 
costs and settlement support for the first year, or otherwise 
repay the government for any use of social security benefits 
through an Assurance of Support arrangement.76 All together, 
these fees and payments could total over AU$100,000 for a 
refugee family of five, as shown in table 2.
Beyond the cost of sponsorship, the CSP adds further eli-
gibility criteria that were not present in the CPP, which, read 
together, discriminate in favour of economically self-suffi-
cient and easy-to-integrate humanitarian entrants. Under 
the CSP, applicants must be what we describe as “job ready,” 
including being between the ages of eighteen and fifty, hav-
ing “functional English,” and “a job offer or skills to enable 
you to get a job quickly.”77 Despite the fact that sponsors bear 
the costs of resettlement, priority is given to CSP applicants 
from countries that the government deems as “resettlement 
priorities.” The precise details are unclear. However, the gov-
ernment has confirmed that priority is given to refugees from 
select countries, including “Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Bhutan, Syria and 
Iraq.”78 While other refugees are not formally excluded, they 
have been told that their applications “are highly unlikely to 
be considered, let alone accepted.”79 As well, although refu-
gees from these regions are indeed priority areas for UNHCR, 
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these priorities have been set by the Australian government, 
and no reason has been provided for why other groups are 
deprioritized. 
Aside from the age criterion, the requirements set out 
above are broadly stated and vague, and it is unclear how the 
criteria are being interpreted and applied. Indeed, questions 
of definition and interpretation arise acutely in the “work-
ready” requirement. The government has confirmed that 
“priority [will be] given to applicants who have an employ-
ment offer” and to “applicants willing to live and work in 
regional Australia.”80 But in the absence of an employment 
offer, it is difficult to ascertain exactly who will be deemed 
to be job ready. Indeed, while the government envisions that 
the program will be taken up by corporate sponsors as part 
of their “corporate social responsibility” principles, this is yet 
to be seen. Indeed, it is much easier and cheaper for busi-
nesses to invest in and support refugees already in Australia, 
rather than pay significant fees to sponsor new refugees who 
are not guaranteed to be accepted and may take years to 
arrive. Feedback from APOs suggests that the only businesses 
involved in the CSP are those run by refugee communities 
themselves, through offers of employment to sponsored 
family members.
The overall profile of an eligible applicant confirms that 
the program is not designed, as a matter of priority, to reset-
tle the most vulnerable or at-risk refugees and humanitarian 
applicants.81 The program certainly does not aim to accom-
modate “doubly disadvantaged” entrants, as was the case 
under the CRSS. The considerable definitional scope of the 
criteria and the emphasis on government resettlement prior-
ities confirms that the government will retain high levels of 
discretion in selection. Certainly the elderly, those without 
“relevant qualifications,” and those without English-language 
skills are unlikely to be viable candidates for sponsorship 
under the program. As well, there are clear gendered impli-
cations in the criteria. The “job ready” requirement means 
that female-headed households and those with major care 
responsibilities are less likely to qualify as primary appli-
cants, and the criteria are also likely to compound women’s 
uneven access to, or outright exclusion from, education and 
work in some countries of origin. 
In its review of the Cpp, the Australian government sug-
gested that as a result of sponsorees’ limited access to state-
funded support services, private sponsorship may not be the 
most appropriate avenue for highly vulnerable applicants 
for whom services may be more “appropriately provided by 
Table 2. Fees and costs under the CSP
Stage Fee Cost
Stage A APO Expression of Interest fee $275
Stage B APO fee $3,410
Stage C APO fee




Stage D APO fee
Second Visa Application Charge (to the Australian 
government)
$5,865 
$16,444 (+$2680 per each additional applicant)
Stage E APO bond
Humanitarian Settlement Support fee
Assurance of Support Program 
$5,000 (may be refundable)
$611 per person
The cost of social security use over the first year, which 
can be up to $17,513.60 for an individual or $42,595.28 
for a family of five
Other 
costs
Airfares, pre-departure medical screenings, and costs 






Source: AMES Australia, “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),” https://www.ames.net.au/csp/faqs.
Note: This is an example based on a specific APO’s service charges. Precise APO fees differ between organizations, but visa 
application fees remain consistent.
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government-funded settlement service providers.”82 While 
there is merit to this view, in the same breath the govern-
ment confirmed that the processing of privately sponsored 
applications would be “assessed with high priority, wherever 
possible” to encourage sponsors to participate in the CSP “as 
a resettlement option over, or in addition to, other resettle-
ment options through the standard humanitarian program.”83 
It is the cumulative effect of these factors that forms the basis 
of our critique. Resettlement places are being allocated away 
from vulnerable applicants, and those places are simultane-
ously being prioritized ahead of other refugee applicants.
Even in cases where applicants are not uniquely vulnerable 
but have “commonplace” resettlement needs, a related con-
cern is the lack of clarity regarding how businesses and cor-
porations might effectively act as sponsors. In 2017 Assistant 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection Alex Hawke 
said that the program was a chance for businesses to fulfill 
their corporate social responsibility rather than merely a cost-
saving measure. 84 He explained that “the idea is of course to 
have that support there provided by business groups who may 
know refugees in different camps, who they want to bring out 
[to Australia] who have the skills.”85 While the government 
has clearly emphasized the potential of businesses to meet 
corporate social responsibility targets through sponsorship, 
uptake of the program by businesses is unlikely to be strong 
without the careful and long-term establishment of relation-
ships between refugee organizations, local refugee networks, 
and business communities. Further, the high costs of the pro-
gram are likely to be a disincentive for businesses considering 
supporting refugees. As the Community Refugee Sponsorship 
Initiative (CRSI) has noted, while businesses may play a vital 
role in a sponsorship program, they are not well placed to 
directly sponsor refugees or to “provide ongoing settlement 
support and assistance for sponsored refugees.”86
A final concern with the current CSP model is the lack of 
a truly community-orientated settlement program. Spon-
sors are not required to form a sponsorship group, meaning 
that individuals can act as sponsors. As refugee advocacy 
organizations predicted in the discussion paper for the CSP,87 
the lack of a criteria for wider community participation 
has meant that the CSP has again become an expensive yet 
expedited family reunion program for those desperate to get 
their family to safety. According to information provided by 
an APO, over 90 per cent of applications under the CSP have 
come from individual family members. 
Because there is an insufficient number of family reunion 
pathways for refugees in Australia,88 the CSP offers those 
who can afford it a way to fast-track their family reunion 
application. While the lack of family reunion pathways in 
Australia must be addressed,89 the current CSP risks becom-
ing a privatized and extortionately expensive family reunion 
program rather than a model that utilizes the social capital 
and support of the wider Australian community. Feedback 
from APOs suggests that this is already the case, with over 90 
per cent of applicants being family members of sponsors. A 
truly community-based sponsorship program should enable 
and encourage the wider community to be involved in set-
tling refugees, rather than leaving it to a single family or fam-
ily members.
Private Sponsorship in Australia: A Cautionary 
Tale? 
As noted in our introduction, Australia is one of a number of 
states that have adopted or are adopting new programs for 
private or community sponsorship of refugees. Amongst the 
wide range of approaches to refugee sponsorship, Australia’s 
program is unique insofar as it hijacks humanitarian places 
in order to allocate them into a privately funded resettlement 
program. By contrast, for example, New Zealand’s recently 
introduced community sponsorship pilot, the Community 
Organisation Refugee Sponsorship Category, provides an 
additional twenty-five places to complement resettlement 
places from its quota. However, like the CSP, the eligibility 
criteria for the New Zealand pilot focus on individuals who 
have basic English-language proficiency, are between eight-
een and forty-five years old, and have a minimum of three 
years’ work experience or a qualification requiring a mini-
mum of two years of tertiary study.90
Overall, the Australian and New Zealand approaches dif-
fer markedly from other community sponsorship models. 
The emphasis on employability and English-language profi-
ciency arguably distorts the traditional focus on resettlement 
of the most vulnerable of refugees. Instead, these criteria 
allow states to claim that they are contributing to the global 
resettlement pool, while simultaneously using community 
sponsorship to reduce the cost of resettlement and increase 
their ability to select desired refugees. If other countries were 
to follow suit, this approach would have significant implica-
tions for resettlement principles and policy worldwide. 
To address the concerns outlined above, in 2018 a group 
of leading civil society organizations in Australia formed a 
campaign group to advocate for a better community spon-
sorship model that harnesses the power of community 
support.91 The Community Refugee Sponsorship Initiative 
(CRSI) is calling for the government to provide up 10,000 
community-sponsored places per annum in addition to the 
refugee program, with no revenue-raising visa charges or APO 
fees. In order to foster community engagement in the settle-
ment process, the CRSI has recommended that individuals 
can partner with a registered and suitably credentialed non-
profit association (an “Approved Community Organisation”), 
which will be responsible for raising funds to cover the costs 
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of airfares, other initial settlement costs, and the first year 
of settlement. Sponsored refugees would have access to gov-
ernment social security benefits, the costs of which would 
be billed back to the sponsors by the government after the 
first year of settlement. The CRSI model will “reduce the cost 
of sponsoring a family of five from up to $100,000 (under 
the CSP) to between $20,000 and $50,000, depending on the 
extent to which income support is required in the first year 
after arrival.”92 The initiative also advocates removal of any 
discriminatory selection criteria and the requirement for 
sponsored refugees to be job ready.
The model proposed by CRSI would bring Australia closer 
to the model of community sponsorship in Canada, where 
additionality is a key principle, and umbrella sponsorship 
agreement holders play a key role in mobilizing a broad 
base of community sponsors. The model would also move 
Australia closer to its historical roots under the CRSS, where 
the focus of the program was on community involvement 
in refugee resettlement and the provision of quality of set-
tlement outcomes, rather than requiring the applicant to be 
“integration ready” with no government support. 
A further issue to be considered when reforming com-
munity sponsorship is whether sponsors are able to name 
or select which refugees to sponsor. In Canada the ability to 
name refugees in the private sponsorship program has cre-
ated an “echo effect,” whereby those who are privately spon-
sored in turn use the program to sponsor family members. 
Over time, this has meant that private sponsorship is increas-
ingly dominated by family reunification applications.93 In 
order to address the issue of community sponsorship places 
being predominantly used as a means of family reunifica-
tion, Canada has introduced a Blended Visa Office–Referred 
(BVOR) Program. Under the BVOR, UNHCR refers vulnerable 
refugees to the Canadian government, and they are matched 
to sponsors, and the cost of settlement is split 50/50 between 
the sponsorship group and the government. The uptake of 
BVOR has been limited, and it remains to be seen whether 
the program can shift emphasis away from family reunifi-
cation.94 The United Kingdom has taken a similar route. 
Under the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPRS), 
UNHCR-referred refugees are matched with sponsorship 
groups. Sponsorship groups must have support from their 
local area government and must have an approved settle-
ment plan to sponsor refugees. The criteria for resettlement 
under the BVOR and VPRS are based on vulnerability rather 
than other settlement criteria. Given the limited opportu-
nities for family reunification in Australia, we suggest that 
considerable thought needs to be given to the relationship 
between family reunification and community sponsorship. 
The family reunification issue and the CSP’s focus on job-
ready refugees points to a wider consideration central to 
the design and implementation of private sponsorship in all 
jurisdictions: the relationship between community sponsor-
ship and complementary or alternative migration pathways. 
An obvious question is whether refugees who are readily 
employable ought to be supported by states through conces-
sions that allow them easier access to regular skilled/labour 
migration pathways. Similarly, states could provide refugees 
with easier access to family migration under mainstream 
migration programs. In order to preserve the inherent focus 
of resettlement on vulnerable refugees, states should carefully 
consider the role of community sponsorship in the context 
of a suite of durable solutions available to refugees. In the 
context of the CSP, it is reasonable to ask whether, as a matter 
of principle, Australia’s skilled migration program could be 
amended to achieve similar outcomes without intrusion into 
Australia’s humanitarian program. 
Conclusion
Under the banner of the militarized joint-agency taskforce 
Operation Sovereign Borders, and through implementation 
of a series of aggressive non-entrée policies, including asy-
lum boat turn-backs, Australia has prevented the arrival of 
onshore asylum seekers in favour of its “managed” refugee 
resettlement program. Simultaneously, the Australian gov-
ernment has attempted to promote the CSP as a complemen-
tary pathway for refugee protection. However, rather than 
being “in addition,” as promised when announced at the 
New York Leaders’ Summit on Refugees, the CSP does not 
complement or expand Australia’s humanitarian program. 
Rather, the program represents a continuation of the gov-
ernment’s policies of refugee deterrence and control. Indeed, 
when Prime Minister Turnbull announced the CSP at the 
2016 summit, he stated, “Because we have control of our 
borders, we are able to deliver that generous humanitarian 
programme.”95
This agenda of control is further pursued through the 
eligibility criteria for CSP, which seeks to cherry-pick “job 
ready” refugees with high integration capacity from pre-
ferred countries of origin. In addition, the Australian model 
of private sponsorship reduces the government’s financial 
commitment to humanitarian resettlement in real terms. 
Unlike other programs, it requires sponsors to pay fees that 
bear no clear or direct correlation with the real costs of reset-
tlement. The costs of participating in the program are not 
merely prohibitive but, somewhat surprisingly, have been 
characterized by the government as a revenue-raising meas-
ure. These features of the CSP critiqued in this article are not 
minor details within the overall program. They reveal the 
core neoliberal principles of economic rationalization and 
market-driven privatization of public services, guiding pri-
vate sponsorship in Australia. Given these elements of the 
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